Dr. M. S. HaqA few years ago, I made a number of proposals that included inter alia: explorations and exploitations of cyber opportunities for disablement of security codes that are, as appropriate, responsible for say controlling of launching of nuke (nuclear) weapons; the use of imaging technologies for accurate and precision targeting and hitting under certain circumstances; and by implications, the use of unpredictability as a weapon of surprise, as well as competitiveness in pertinent areas – in overall pursuits of (help) halting, in a proactive manner, attempts towards possible use of above weapons. One of the purposes was to assist in the development and maintenance of anti-nuke capabilities – at local, global and other levels – in the form of proactive antidotes to possible use of nuke weapons by concerned countries.
The proposal was made at the time when vulnerabilities of Pakistani nuke had started taking the size of a critical mass – as a result of growing terrorism and extremism in the country – in the context of anticipated ramifications, when nuke related advancements in North Korea and Iran were receiving media and other attentions in debates and discourses at local, global and other levels, and when the news concerning new antidotes to nuke weapons or their developments were not in public knowledge.
Apparent anatomy (structure), physiology (function) and outcomes of Offensive Cyber Effect Operations (OCEO) capabilities under Policy Directive 20 of the US are, in certain ways and as appropriate, in conformity with the above proposal that reflected on antidotes to nuke products – harmful or otherwise like nuke weapons. Offensive cyber capabilities of USA (I mean OCEO) are reportedly ‘capable’ of conducting cyber war with little or no warning to the target – they are also capable of causing varying degrees of damage to the target. An initial and brief analysis of OCEO capabilities would reveal several existential and evolving challenges in pertinent areas. A few of them have been presented here – not in the order of priority and importance but they are relative to time, space and other variables.
01. Inabilities of OCEO to protect itself from presently known revelations – via Edward Snowden – is evident, unless to an extent though, revelations so far have failed to reveal the whole true face or whole face or otherwise as applicable of OCEO. It is not at present clear as to how USA will secure integrity of OCEO, promote its competitiveness and improve its operational effectiveness during post revelation periods and beyond, and at what costs and benefits to whom? What are present day statuses of preparation for cyber wars on the part of other world countries on a per capita or other basis? Also, how about intervening and other variables in domains of cyber warfare that could shorten or expand or deal otherwise with economic, operations and other life cycles of OCEO?
02. Capabilities of OCEO to discriminate targets in OCEO program countries in the presence of a variety of in-country antidotes to say cyber attacks – natural or person made or otherwise as applicable, whether existential or evolving – could pose a formidable challenge to futures of OCEO. What kinds of sensors/servomechanisms (used in equivalent engineering and other senses) are at present or will be in the future available for detection of or dealing with (or both) for instance fluctuating scenarios of targets of OCEO and other related things – in efforts towards striking the right balance between effectiveness and risks and vice versa for meeting challenges of Policy Directive 20 of the US?
03. Ramifications of attacks on present day nuke reactors and ramifications of present day nuke attacks on targets could have something in common in terms of for example and as appropriate nature of damage and destruction caused (to be) to the targets by above attacks – but they might greatly differ from each other when it will come to say respective outcomes in terms of magnitudes of loss, damage and destruction as a result of those attacks. It is not at present clear, among other things, as to whether or not causes, effects and causalities of above ramifications – fully or in part – will be overtaken by those of OECO capabilities that have been reportedly described as very dangerous in the content classified as top secret. It is also not at present clear as to whether or not ramifications of OECO supported cyber wars will create ‘non-traditional’ outcomes – are soft power applications via cyber wars capable of causing damage and destructions greater than those of present day nuke products with zero loss of Life or otherwise as appropriate? By the way, what does the above term very dangerous imply – is it a psychological or real threat, a real time threat or otherwise, as applicable? What are levels of OECO challenge perceptions?
One thing is apparently getting clear: OECO program countries (target countries) with large ICT involvements at say operations levels – that have weak infrastructures to detect cyber war threats and weak antidotes to fight cyber wars in a proactive, reactive and other manner, to mention a few – could become worst victims of OECO supported wars. How about cyber war preparations of Bangladesh? It may not be out of place to mention here: present day efforts of Bangladesh towards nuke power should, among other things, take into consideration protective measures in a proactive fashion against say possible cyber wars in the future – via diversification of plant control systems, decentralized layers of plant security arrangements, effective early warning systems including the use of effective servomechanisms, nuke disaster containment plans, as well as programs, and trained personnel in pertinent areas, to mention a few – during the life time of proposed nuke plant.
In the final analysis, it is apparent outcomes from a fully blown and effective regime of OECO through the foreseeable future could inter alia and as appropriate be instrumental in: redefining further state and other sovereignties; taking toll on scarce useful resources in the form say damage and destruction in an increasingly interdependent world; bringing about changes in the course of present day warfare, diplomacy and education; creation of new and additional job opportunities in cyber markets; providing additional cyber exposures to human and other genes in relation to rest of universes and beyond and vice versa against the backdrop of Gene mechanics – triggering initial conditions for discoveries, innovations, and inventions leading perhaps to development of cyber alternatives in relevant areas; and contributing to a ‘civilization loss’ as a result of losses and destructions of products of Gene mechanics such as institutional memories. It will not be illogical to assume here – probably all types of E meaning E-commerce, E-governance, E-mail, and E-marketing, to mention a few, could be dangerously affected by OECO led cyber wars in the absence of for example fully operational regulatory regimes at local, global and other levels.
It is also apparent the road map to recovery from say OECO led cyber war ramifications is not yet in public knowledge. It is not at present known as to what extent and how the cyber ramifications will be instrumental in inter alia disablement of coping capacities of affected countries, the people, institutions and others. It is also not at present known – what will be the lead time for the recovery and at what costs and benefits to whom? How about possible roles of black hole, space-time cloak, Gene mechanics, imbalances between matter and antimatter, and others in fighting cyber wars through future times? Let us work towards that in a quicker and result-oriented fashion. God bless.
(The author is inter alia former Course Coordinator, Lecturer, Satellite Tutor, and Exam paper Examiner at the University of South Pacific – Fiji)
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