By Usama NizamaniAs a conclusive consequence of the audacious or rather a display of an inconsiderate military acumen by Japanese military echelon in WWII to launch Pearl Harbor offense and drag the U.S. into the war in 1941, the U.S. Air Force decided to reveal for the first time its most destructive weapon in the conventional military standoff (after almost four years of the war) on August 6th and 9th of 1945. What stands open to dispute, is the acumen of the American administration. Was it more compromised than their Japanese counterpart by bringing such abrupt and massive death toll and destruction to the Japanese nation (to conclude the war)? Realists back then may have found comfort in resorting to the rationale, ‘Everything is fair in love and war’ or probably as some (from the Bomb Lobby-read General Curtis LeMay of U.S. Air Force) may have rightly, but sadly reasoned, that they must subdue the Japanese Empire by ‘psychological shock’. That said, this later view too is disputed among academicians and scholars.
The decision to unleash the Nuclear Bomb upon the American foe was to also serve as a global predicament for the U.S in the history to follow. Although, what led to a cease of the military standoff between the two countries and in an ultimate defeat of the Japanese Empire, it left behind a carnage of hundreds of thousands of people and an uncountable pile of rubble in the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
However, this shall not be enough as other aspirants or compelled ones would follow the suit akin to a domino effect, commencing from the Soviet Russia, which didn’t want to allow a repeat of another gruesome episode of Battle of Stalingrad. Similarly, De Gaulle’s France in 1960s came to terms with the bitter truth that the impervious Maginot-Line was not enough to render the country impregnable against the invading Nazi-Germans or anyone posing an existential threat to it. To the Chinese that didn’t want to meet the fate of Japanese at the hands of the Americans or the soviets as a result of their widening ideological gulf with the Soviets, thus they carried out their successful test at Lop Nor in 1964, followed by the Indians in 1974 at Pokhran citing the 1962 defeat at the hands of Chinese and not to spare India vulnerable for another colonial subjugation, to Pakistan which succumbed to Indian aggression in its unguarded Eastern wing in 1971 and the resort of India to Nuclear weapons compelling it to test its own after the series of Indian Tests in May 1998 at Chagi, Baluchistan.
The Nuclear Deterrence so far has prevented conventional counters (at Borders) or averted anyone to enter in a direct Nuclear-Conflict realizing the ramshackle-like consequences as a result of mutually assured destruction (examples being Cuban-Missile Crisis or Indo-Pak mobilization of 2002 and 2008).
However, as of lately a new development which includes the exploitation of cyber-technology, has been effective in inflicting harm by use of non explosive or by non-interventional methods. In the operational realm referred to as “cyber-attacks”. They have lately become a focus of defense-strategists, officials and various militaries across the world. The first large scale de-classified use of the audacious cyber-attacks came through joint collaboration of U.S.-Israeli officials aimed at decelerating the uranium enrichment operations of Iran at Natanz (uranium) enrichment center.
The virus officially declared by its code name “Olympic Games” and popularly gained fame by the name “Stuxnet”. Its joint production was undertaken in U.S. and Israel after the executive authorization of the then President Bush in 2006 but its execution from Fort Meade, headquarters National Security Agency in 2008 was overseen by his successor President Obama at the Situation Room, White House. The cost to produce the cyber-weapon incurred millions of US $. But it came as an alternative to taking down the uranium enrichment sites of Iran in a conventional manner, which was (intended to be) used by U.S. as a negotiation tool while enrichment operations of Iranians remained crippled-at least by the computer worm.
Despite slowing down Iran’s capability the ability to compel them to a negotiation table is disputable, particularly how Iranians thereafter the realization of the computer worm took measures to overcome the loopholes at different tiers to ensure the security of their enrichment or proliferation operations and since then (as per various reports) have tenaciously increased their uranium enrichment.
However, the million dollar question that looms over this development is “what” precedent the declared move will have on the global security canvas for international powers? Would it prove to be the Hiroshima and Nagasaki of the Cyber-Offense, particularly considering the consequences the ‘declared’ and an ‘owned’ move will have for other world powers? Perhaps a simplistic answer would be a plain ‘Yes’ as there remains little ambiguity that others will not hold back from following the suit. “Olympic Games” can very well be the “Little Boy” of the Cyber-Warfare as neither any Alpine Line nor the nuclear deterrence itself (which was also reasoned by General James Cartwright when he opined the idea of Olympic Games-reference ‘Confront & Conceal’ by David E. Sanger) would be enough to thwart capable states from trespassing each other’s backyard via the virtual world.
The only way to ensure that is with the identical response to the strategic vacuum created in post-nuclear attacks over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It only lies in the inevitable realization of similar capabilities (in the cyber warfare), to carry out counter offenses with similar effect and magnitude upon the adversary-state and as a means deter or perhaps counter them. Succinctly, just alike the pursuit of Nuclear Deterrence the answer to massive, overwhelming, or precise cyber threat to sensitive and valuable (national) assets (infrastructure) lies solely in Cyber-Deterrence. There are convincing reasons as to why this renders to be the sole means.
Firstly, unlike the conventional-interventional means of military, the use of cyber-weapons is precise and most importantly it doesn’t bring the adverse or (undesirable) drastic drawbacks of war, such as risking large casualties of war, collateral damage or tons of debris as a result of the destruction caused by the use of various firepower including aerial bombardment.
Also, the cyber-weapons are not subject to cause the usual scenes of death and destruction in form of en massacres or complete annihilation of a localized population unlike those caused by the employment of a nuclear weapon. Although, this doesn’t in anyway serve to be an argument about the futility of Nuclear weapons or imply that they have no utility in today’s strategic facets. Since, reasoning that would be akin to a flawed argument not based on the appraisal of intricate dynamics of international security.
Further, the decision to not pursue the cyber-weapons (at a level which serves as a deterrent) program will leave many vulnerable at the aggression of the capable-powers or non-state actors, and thus as a result leave not just the security but the functionality of millions or probably billions of worth of national assets at the behest of the intruding states –and if we may also include the information held by private corporations, such as that of bank accounts, credit cards, other personal data and etc). Among the civil and military infrastructure and installations that may remain compromised could include, power grid-stations, energy generation plants, including dam operations, civil and military aviation operations and controls, nuclear plants (Natanz Enrichment Center being an example), national intelligence data, military industrial plants and complexes and on a horrifying note space operations too, including space stations, shuttles and missions – which may not be a pretty sight to witness by any state engaged in space operations neither an amount of capital worth risking.
The same goes for other sensitive installations which can be induced with self destructive behaviors (by cyber weapons) to bring the machineries or the installations to a total collapse- but it may not be limited to these as potential targets for the cyber-weapons. And by virtue of their (cyber-weapons’) potential and capacity, the fact or the more petrifying yet an impending reality compels the states to contemplate the possession of a cyber-deterrence capability as a means to protect and prevent from being aggressed.
While at the same time the possession of the deterrent-capability shall alarm the aggressors of identical nature of ruinous consequences by similar means. Furthermore, along with the possession of the capability the states will probably be required to display them too (through tests) in order to render it as a functional deterrent and last but not the least an effective prowess of the intelligence will be required for the efficacious employment of the new (virtual) armed capability in real time conflict situations. A point, which can yet again find corroboration from the case study of cyber attacks on the Natanz enrichment center. – Eurasia Review
