By Monish GulatiAfter the election of Nawaz Sharif as prime minister of Pakistan, exchange of special envoys by the two countries, the twin visits by US Secretary of State to India and Pakistan and the fact that the current UPA government in India is in its home-run, there was an air of expectancy and hope that significant steps towards enduring peace in the subcontinent were round the corner. Also expected was, as has been the case prior to most major diplomatic engagements bilateral as well as multilateral, a security transgression on the border. On this occasion India received the full spectrum treatment: a suicide bomb attack at its consulate in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the killing of five Indian soldiers at the LoC and persistent widespread communal disturbance in Jammu and Kashmir.
What also ran to the script was the Indian(self-sustaining) reaction; an off-guard government, politicization of the issue, pandemonium in parliament, disrespect of the martyrs, demands for calling off everything from prime minister-level talks, cricket matches, tours by Pakistani qawwals etc . Forty-eight hours later the count of the Line of Control (LoC) violations had gone up to five and the casualty figure of Indian security personnel to six. Quite obviously, what we are doing and have been doing with respect to our relations with our neighbour is not working.
Eminent journalist M.J. Akbar writing in his column on the incident implied that the Indian Defence Minister (Raksha Mantri) A.K. Antony did not make an error in his statement on the LoC issue on the floor of parliament, instead he knowingly crafted a loophole through which the Pakistan army could escape responsibility after having killed, with the help of around 20 terrorists, five Indian soldiers. It may not be so, after all our policy position post-26/11 has been that Pakistan is responsible for all acts of aggression emanating from its territory, including those by non-state actors. In fact by over analyzing the RM’s remarks we have provided a policy loophole to the Pakistanis, which they were quick to seize, denying any acts by its military. Had the Indian government, including its central ministers, articulated explicitly and firmly its own earlier stated policy position it would have saved itself the embarrassment.
Second issue is that of response to LoC violations. India must respond to tactical/local acts at the tactical level and not substitute it with a strategic response. We must put a price on LoC violations, a life for life and a shell for a shell. Let the military respond appropriately, using pre-approved degree of lethal force and a specified time window. Such a procedure already exists – revisit and strengthen it. Have faith and take pride in your military. It’s a very fine professional organisation and it knows how to manage the LoC .
Two, proceed with strategic/ diplomatic response (ideally) after tactical response has been completed. It is the consequence of your tactical response that should determine the diplomatic offensive and not the nature of the neighbour’s tactical action. Three, do not distinguish between a Pakistani military attack, which includes irregulars and an attack by terrorists supported by the Pakistan army – both deserve the same response. Fourthly, respect the LoC and do not cross it while responding – it will ring international alarm bells. Lastly, do not make tactical inaction a strategic virtue. Simply put, do not tie the hands of your military after it has taken one on the chin just to extract strategic advantage, especially when it is a repeat occurrence and you have failed in the previous instance to extract any strategic leverage. If you do, you not only lose diplomatic capital but also disadvantage your military.
M.J. Akbar in his article succinctly lists out the undesirable fallout of the current incident as: “First: five dead Indian soldiers, banished into the oblivion of hypocritical phrases which are this government’s version of a martyr’s farewell. Second: the morale of Indian troops on this vicious border, who must be wondering what the value of their lives is. Third: the humiliation of officers who reported what happened in a war zone. Fourth: the implications of a government policy that capitulates in the face of fire.”
Third issue is the treatment of a LoC violation. Foreign policy should connect only with military matters of strategic significance and not with local incidents. And if we do, we provide a perverse incentive for tactical transgressions to manipulate foreign policy actions. Articulation of foreign policy and pursuance of its objectives has to be isolated from tactical acts. Therefore, if Pakistan wants to pursue discussing Sir Creek and Wullar after a LoC violation, please go along because Pakistan is playing to the international community so should we. In any case we know that by suspending talks we have not in any way ensured that the next violation or a terror attack will not be around the corner. Also, some analysts argue that there has been lack of civilian policy leadership of the military domain. It may be the other way around.
Fourth issue is the engagement of the Pakistan military. We have a situation where after a terror strike/LoC violation we suspend talks as the Pakistani civil elected government could not prevent its territory from being used for such acts. At the same time, we known the dynamics in Pakistan where we are asking the civilian government to deliver something it cannot. The next step should be to follow a protocol with Pakistan which most Western powers are doing – by involving its military in talks. However, we have a policy wherein we talk peace only with elected governments. Also, we do not want third party mediation. That leaves the issue deadlocked. Given the situation, asking General Kayani to join in the peace talks is worth a try.
The related issue is the colonial ‘baggage’ of keeping the military out of national level decision making. It astounds policy makers worldwide as to how little the Indian government consults its military on relevant policy matters. And to beat it, the Indian the government considers it an achievement.
The Indian foreign policy has yet to figure out how to make peace with a neighbour whose sense of nationhood is centred on an enduring hatred for India. The answer, and the lack of it, is going to get more difficult as we head into the general elections. While we continue to find solutions, let us play ‘big brother with wide shoulders’ only in New Delhi and not on the LoC. Let Pakistan decline to give India the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status or withdraw its diplomatic mission staff, we should continue to talk peace. And please do not send the Army Chief on a wild goose chase to manufacture a fig leaf for perceived snafus of the political establishment. – Eurasia Review
