Pakistan – India: A warm response to cold start doctrine

By Beenish Altaf
Pakistan successfully tested this week its surface-to-surface Hatf-IX NASR missile with a range of 60 kilometers. The test included successive launches of 4 x missiles in salvo mode from a state-of-the-art multi-tube launcher. The missile is seemingly capable of carrying nuclear weapons and conventional warheads, but virtually it’s a Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs). NASR with this in-flight maneuver capability is a quick response system equipped with shoot and scoot attributes. Being a sort of TNW it could having strategic nuclear implications for South Asia.Before analyzing the updated test of NASR, it is imperative to recount here that nuclear deterrence is foisted upon Pakistan as a result of India’s aggressive nuclear weapons program. Coming to the point, India is pro-actively firing on a regular basis new tests – for example, just a few days prior to Pakistan’s test, India test-fired a nuclear-capable Prithvi-II missile with a strike range of 350 kilometers, which was also a surface-to-surface missile that was test-fired from a mobile launcher in salvo mode.
Upon this backdrop, Pakistan’s response in the form of TNWs in one way or way is necessary for the restoration and then ultimately maintaining the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. Pakista’s Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, acknowledging the effort as an addition to Pakistan’s deterrence, congratulated the scientists and engineers on this outstanding achievement, which consolidates Pakistan’s deterrence capability. Evidently, the main purpose of this is to ensure that Pakistan has a counter strike capability that limits the threat of India’s conventional limited war.
The test being in a salvo mode is an improved effort to respond to India’s Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) / Proactive Defence Strategy, which was introduced with the purpose of finding space for counter strikes, preemptive counter strikes or limited counter strikes by achieving their objectives remaining below Pakistan nuclear threshold. A press release also explained that Pakistan’s test contributes to full spectrum deterrence against multidimensional threats in view of evolving scenarios. Lt. Gen. (retd) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, termed the short-range ballistic missile Hatf-IX (NASR) a “weapon of peace” after its successful flight test in 2012. The test was a major development which would strengthen deterrence capability of Pakistan at ‘all levels of the threat spectrum, thereby ensuring peace in the region.’ Therefore, Pakistan’s verdict of introducing these weapons in its nuclear force posture is very much intact with ‘Waltz argument that in an anarchical international system, states must rely on self help mechanism for protecting its sovereignty and national security.’
Though for Pakistan the real multifaceted threat festering in South Asia is Indian military expansion and conventional buildup, but pragmatically speaking, if India assumes that it could dominate the war through surgical strikes or its so-called CSD without crossing nuclear threshold then they need to correct themselves keeping the successful series of NASR tests.
The NASR test is actually aimed to target the ‘advancing Indian Army armored columns’ or proactive Indian army operations inside the Pakistan borders. The cutting edge technology (NASR) intends for large army concentration. The Haft IX shoot and scoot nuclear missile could be fired upon an ‘area of operation of a Divisional or Corps level attack.’ Belligerently, former Indian Air Chief’s statement would be relevant to quote here in which he categorically said that ‘such short missile even at this level would invite a massive response from India,’ though he did not name the cities but analysts presume that they might be Lahore and Karachi. Defence analysts have also surmised that Pakistan is at a distinct disadvantage in producing this weapon system, which it cannot use for countering insurgency or counter terrorism with its adversary even though has spent billions of dollars on the same. Ironically, in this context it is believed that it’s more a liability than a benefit since it is not being used to counter threats such as drone attacks, etc., yet being meant for deterrence purposes. Additionally, it might not even be used on either sides of the border.
Lastly, since the game of thorns was initiated by the Indian CSD, Pakistan needs to keep on test firing these upgraded missiles or TNWs. Let’s wait and see how India will react – even so Pakistan should test its upgraded versions in the future and definitely further modernize its ‘weapons of peace’ conditioned by if India continues to build its conventional arms. It is just a soft message to Indians that if they opt for a conventional military strike or to the so called limited war ever, it would not stick to limited war since Pakistan has the capability to retaliate through TNWs, which although small and of a short range, it is nevertheless a nuclear weapon.
The writer works as a Research Associate in the Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad. She has done MA in Defence and Diplomatic Studies from Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi. She works on the areas on non-proliferation primarily regarding South Asia and on the contemporary strategic issues. She can be reached at beenish@thestrategicvision.com
The views expressed are the author’s own. – Eurasia Review