By Andrei Soldatov
It came as a shock to many observers when VimpelCom, one of Russia’s
largest telecommunications companies, publicly criticized the
government’s plans to legalize the interception of telephone and
e-mail communications. VimpelCom sent a letter to the Communications
and Press Ministry criticizing the plan as unconstitutional.
But this type of espionage is not all that new. The principles
governing that system were established and first implemented back in
the 1990s. Every few years since then, the requirements placed upon
Internet providers and phone companies have been updated in accordance
with the latest technologies and the ever-growing appetite of Russia’s
intelligence agencies.
For example, the new spying program requires that phone operators and
Internet providers make it possible for intelligence agencies to
intercept correspondences that users sent through companies such as
Gmail and Yahoo, along with ICQ instant messages and even obligates
the companies to store the information for 12 hours at a time until it
is retrieved by the authorities. These requirements would expand the
authorities’ surveillance capabilities to intercept correspondences
that are passed through foreign Internet providers.
The number of telephone calls and e-mail messages that the Federal
Security Service has intercepted has doubled over the past six years,
from 265,937 in 2007 to 539,864 in 2012. These figures were based on
the number of court sanctions issued to approve the government’s
surveillance of private communications, according to the Supreme
Court. What’s more, other federal agencies have followed the example
of the FSB by legalizing their own communications interception
programs. These include the Federal Drug Control Service, the Interior
Ministry and the Federal Penitentiary Service.
The interception system was designed to avoid any outside control. The
same reasons that prompted the U.S. National Security Agency to create
its PRISM system also motivated Russia to create a legal interception
system it called SORM that has enabled the authorities to remotely
access information from phone operators and Internet providers. For
this purpose, the provider must install a SORM black box that is
connected by a cable to a command center at FSB headquarters. By using
this equipment, FSB agents can monitor all phone conversations, e-mail
correspondence, instant messages, Internet searches and so on.
Notably, Russian telecommunications and Internet companies have not
publicly complained about the practice for many years. The last
instance was in 1998, when the first initiative was introduced
mandating the installation of Internet surveillance equipment. But the
providers did not complain about the violations of Russians’ civil and
privacy rights, but only about the fact that they would be forced to
pay for the SORM equipment.
Today’s situation is different in that communications giant VimpelCom
is upset not only about the requirement that it must bear all of the
expenses of installing the government’s surveillance equipment, but
that such a law would violate citizens’ constitutional right to
confidential correspondence.
Of course, National Security Agency leaker Edward Snowden’s
revelations might have played a key role in mobilizing public opinion
against electronic eavesdropping, but it is also possible that the
sheer speed with which the government has been encroaching on Internet
privacy is what prompted VimpelCom to become such an outspoken
opponent of such measures.
The same day that VimpelCom openly criticized the FSB surveillance
program, another government agency requested the right to intercept
information. Oddly enough, it was not an intelligence agency but the
Central Bank that made the request. The bank prepared amendments to
the law on insider trading that would give it access to private
telephone conversations and correspondence in an effort to identify
potential abusers of inside information on financial markets.
The Central Bank has already leveled fines against Rambler.ru and
Mail.ru, Russia’s two largest such providers, for refusing to provide
correspondence information without a court order. According to the
Central Bank, collecting “metadata” — general information about who is
corresponding with whom without actually reading the content of those
correspondences — does not violate the constitutional rights of
Internet users, but the e-mail providers argue that it is technically
impossible to obtain that information without actually opening the
letters themselves.
According to those companies, the efforts of the Central Bank to gain
access to such information and its use of heavy fines to force
compliance has inspired other government agencies with no connection
to fighting terrorism or crime to make similar demands for information
on their clients — and all without a court order. Everyone wants in on
this spying game.
There are already eight siloviki agencies that have the right to
monitor the correspondence and phone conversations of anyone they
choose. The key question is: How many will be listening alongside them
one year from now?
Andrei Soldatov is an intelligence analyst at ¬Agentura.ru and
co-author of “The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security
State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB.”- Eurasia Review
