By Ihsan BalUrban uprisings have felled governments across the Arab world, including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, and threatened even more. Despite the widespread expectation that Arab publics would never succeed in overthrowing their regimes through street protests, recent history has surprised many.This awakening in the Arab streets has sparked many debates. The Turkish government perceived these movements as legitimate protests stemming from social, economic, and political demands, and supported them. In a sense, Ankara preferred to side with democracy and change, rather than status quo and stability. To be certain, this stance was not just an arbitrary choice.
In response, Arab leaders clung to the rhetoric that there were “external threats” and “collaborators / conspirators” behind the incidents, as if all the protestors were speaking with the same voice. Turkey, on the other hand, insisted that these movements were reflecting the very real desires of the Arab people. Turkey even considered itself to be a chief propagator of the principles of democracy, the rule of law, justice, and transparency—all of which underlay the street movements, and this was perceived as Turkey’s “soft power” in the Middle East. We can conceptualize this as the “Turkey-ization” of the Middle East.
Turkey’s soft power: Various institutions from universities to think tanks have conducted a great amount of research on how these discourses manifest themselves on the ground. The studies of think tanks like TESEV and BİLGESAM and universities such as Fatih University have contributed to the formation of a rich database around the idea of “Turkish Model”. One of the shared points of the studies is that the masses, hungry for change, have been impressed by Turkey. This admiration comes from the spread of Turkish businesses, Turkish television programs, and Turkish initiatives in the fields of commerce, culture, and education in Arab countries. The other side of this interaction are the increasing numbers of Arab tourists, students, and investors coming to Turkey. The common conclusion of these studies has been that Arabs have been observing the Turkish economy and its synthesis of democracy and a Muslim identity with great interest. Turkey’s especially exemplary successes are in the spheres of democracy, law, rights, and liberties. Other frequently cited reasons why Turkey is watched with interest are its aspiration to be an EU member, its increasing clout in the international system, and its resolve to tackle its problems and fulfill its responsibilities.
Studies revealed a rather significant window into Arab public opinion with the question “why is Turkey a model or a source of inspiration?” Many answers were in the vein of “yes, we have some differences, but Turkey’s society is one of the closest to our own that has had success in achieving the current demands of the Arab street.” These Arab responders seem to recognize Turkey as “one of us”. However, it is also important to note that there are a considerable number of opinions arguing that the “Turkish Model” is too ambitious or even irrelevant.
The Gezi Park incidents: Criticisms of the “Turkish Model” notion have their own merits and consistencies. However, none have been so damaging to Turkey’s image as the incidents related to Gezi Park. From the first day of the protests, various pundits likened Istanbul’s Gezi Park to Cairo’s Tahrir Square and not only declared the “Turkish Model” to be dead, but they even portrayed Turkey as behind the Arab Street.
Yet the closest thing to a “Turkish Spring” was experienced during the democratic initiatives between 1946 and 1950 in Turkey. It also bears remembering that the Turkish authorities recalled this transition process to the Assad regime at the beginning of the popular uprising in Syria. However, the Turkish EU minister adopted a wrong, easily misinterpreted line by saying that the Turkish Spring started in 2002–when the AKP came to power–as if he forgot the 1946-50 period.
Throughout the “Turkish Spring” debates, accusatory conspiracy theories about forces behind the Gezi incidents have further damaged Turkey’s image. These conspiracy theories have undermined Turkey’s claim that it can cooperate with the West and solve its own problems through honest self-reflection. The expression, summarizing Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s political vision, that “Turkey has friends and potential friends,” has unfortunately been tarnished by the scapegoating of external powers for the Gezi incidents. Moreover, this emphasis on external powers has frustrated efforts to find common ground and compromise, resulting in further national polarization.
Even if there are conspiracies, making them the centerpiece of the discourse is the wrong way to go about solving problems. If conspiracy analyses could solve problems, the Middle East would doubtlessly be the most developed region of the world. This, needless to say, is not the case.
Those discontented with the rise of “Turkish Model” have taken advantage of this latest Turkish faltering, and overstated the radicalization of society and the heavy-handed government response, projecting a decidedly authoritarian image of the country. Though compromise and reconciliation have not received the required energy or attention, mistakes and offenses have been exaggerated. So much so, in fact, that protestors rationalized overthrowing a popular, democratically-elected government as a justifiable proposition. When examined in this light, Turkey does indeed seem to be sinking fast.
A stained Image?
Political elites gladly took credit for Turkey’s reputation when the narrative described a democratizing, internationally-respected, rising economic powerhouse. However, if a government is unwilling to countenance even fair criticism, its ability to restore a foundering image is limited. Similarly, it’s difficult to sustain healthy pluralist democracies when both praise for success and criticism for failure are disproportionate.
To be sure, a country’s image, values, and admirable characteristics do not suddenly vanish. If Turkey really is the country it claims to be, it will be able to handle the present disquiet and come out of it stronger. Maybe what will make the Turkish Model sustainable and resilient will be its capacity to produce creative solutions for the country’s problems.
Momentarily refocusing to view Turkey at the regional level presents a worthwhile comparison. Lately, there have been some trailers like “Fretful Turkey, moderate Iran” put into show.[1] The topic of the first film in the series is that İran’s new leader, President Rouhani is a moderate who can speak five languages and has a doctorate from Glasgow.[1] Such readings, ignore the fact that the office of the president is very limited in a regime ruled by Mullahs and that the elections are not fully open and competitive.[2] Turkish decision-makers and pundits who subscribe to this view should evaluate what is real and what is conspiracy in a more critical and consistent way.
If, rather than the Middle East being ‘Turkey-ized”, Turkey has been “Middle Eastern-ized” and suffers from the conspiratorial syndrome, we urgently need to address this. We can only do this by looking at ourselves before blaming others for our shortcomings. If this can be accomplished, the “Turkish Model” will develop a powerful allure based on a very real success. – Eurasia Review
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