The Indian debate on Afghanistan, particularly on issues post-2014, has centred on security concerns regarding influx of militants from Afghanistan into Kashmir, the Pakistani agenda in Kabul, opening of an alternate trade route with Afghanistan through the Iranian port of Chabahar, India’s development programmes and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, and the more contentious issue of providing military aid to the Afghan defence forces. The last subject is stirred up periodically during the frequent visits of the Afghan president to India. In Afghanistan, besides the flux over the outcome of the upcoming presidential elections, President Hamid Karzai’s refusal to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US, essential to ensure
sufficient US military presence in Afghanistan after 2014, has further heightened the uncertainty over some key determinants of Afghanistan’s future.
In Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an al-Qaeda affiliate, has been increasing its presence in the country’s Anbar province, and early this month captured positions in Ramadi and Fallujah. Liberated from al-Qaeda in 2004 at a cost of 122 US deaths, Fallujah is 65 km west of Baghdad in the vast Sunni-dominated and largely desert province of Anbar, which borders Syria. This development is the most serious challenge to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government since the departure of the US forces two years ago after Maliki failed to sign the BSA between the two countries. Iraqi government troops have since surrounded Fallujah and Maliki has made an appeal for international support saying that failure to counter ISIS would lead to “the creation of evil state-lets that would wreak havoc with security in the region and the world”. The situation in Iraq is catching the analyst’s attention as the unfolding developments are similar to some of the likely scenarios predicted for Afghanistan post-2014. Specifically, these could provide tangible pointers to the fate that might befall Afghanistan due to a resurgent al-Qaeda, in the eventuality that the BSA is not signed and the US exercises the ‘zero option’ to completely pull out from the country post 2014. Indian analysts would be particularly interested to see how US responds to the current situation in Iraq and negotiates the option of military aid, including air support assets, given the tenuous regional dynamics of the Middle East post the Iran nuclear deal. Situation in Iraq Analysts attribute the situation in Iraq largely to the government’s vengeful style of politics which has targeted the Sunni minority. The government has also reneged on its promise to pay the Sunni tribal militias that the US had mobilized in 2007 and 2008 to battle al-Qaeda in Fallujah and other areas of Anbar province. Also causing concern to the US on the situation in Iraq is Tehran’s willingness to step in and send military equipment and advisers on Baghdad’s request. It is felt that any direct Iranian assistance to Iraq has the potential to exacerbate sectarian tensions in the country, as Iraqi Sunnis accuse Tehran of backing the government’s repressive policies against them. As part of its response the US has sought to accelerate the deliveries of US military equipment, comprising missiles and surveillance drones, to increase the Iraqi military’s capacity for robust surveillance and intelligence capability as they counter the al-Qaida. The US is providing shipments of 100 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, as well as aerostat balloons, 10 ScanEagle and 48 Raven drones to Iraq. Iraq has also sought to purchase an unspecified number of Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopters from the US. However, analysts feel that the Apaches cannot help Iraq in the current conflict against al-Qaeda as it would take years to absorb and field these helicopters, even if their delivery was expedited. Having equipment is not the same as being able to use it effectively. The counter view is that sending the helicopters now would be an indication of increasing US support and influence. Amongst the other issues that the US government is considering is the possible use of these helicopters against the Iraqi government’s political opponents, including attacks on the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group that found refuge in Iraq. Baghdad has sought to push back Kurdish control in areas disputed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). It is also felt that the Apache sale may cause the Sunni community to become less willing to help in the fight against al-Qaeda. US is therefore evaluating the impact of its arms sales on all possible interest groups and eliminating the possibility
of further aggravating the situation. The US is also factoring in the likely regional consequences of its arms sale. One being that Sunni-majority countries such as Saudi Arabia could perceive the arms sales as an indication that Washington is favouring Shiites; on the other hand, Tehran could interpret the
same as a sign of US strategic realignment toward the Shiite axis. This could also result in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies pursuing policies such as arming and funding of radical groups in Syria. US would like its Sunni allies in the Middle East to view its strategy as balanced and neutral. According to latest reports, US has decided to withhold its sales of attack helicopters to Iraq for the time being. India in arriving at a decision to provide military aid could face similar challenges of sectarianism, tribal/ethnic factionalism, Islamist extremism and competing interest of neighbours in the Afghanistan post-2014. Indian Position India though appears to have arrived at some sort of position, at least for now, on the issue of left over US military equipment in Afghanistan. According to media reports, India has asked the US not to leave combat force multipliers, like night vision devices, mine protected vehicles etc, after it exits Afghanistan this year on the concerns that these might fall into the hands of Taliban and eventually Pakistan. The Indian apprehension over US hardware had been raised by National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, and Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh with their counterparts. To that end US Assistant Secretary of Defence for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs, Peter Lavoy, who was in India recently, has reportedly assured that US will not leave behind heavy weaponry and ammunition during its drawdown from Afghanistan. There has also been concern of Pakistan passing on captured high-tech US weaponry to China. India has impressed upon Washington that Afghanistan National Army (ANA) should be equipped suitably for counter-terrorist tasks only and not with high lethality weapons which are more suited to conventional war making. This report brings some clarity to the Indian position on the issue, and at the same time it closes the loop with what many analysts believe is Pakistan’s stand on US supply of lethal equipment to the ANA. In the past few years, Pakistani and Afghan armies have engaged in short but sharp skirmishes along the border and Pakistan has it sexpressed reservations on US equipment supplied to the ANA being used against Pakistani soldiers. While the current Indian stand on US equipment in Afghanistan is influenced by competing Indo-Pak interests in the region, the US dilemma in Iraq indicates that the decision to provide Indian military aid to Afghanistan post-2014 will be far more complex. This article appeared at the South Asia Monitor and reprinted with permission. By Monish Gulati– Eurasia Review
